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Abstract. 
structures and processes are  discussed. Identification of vulnerable areas 
usually depends more on particular and often detailed knowledge than on 
algorithmic o r  mathematical procedures. In some cases, machine inference can 
facilitate the identification. The analysis scheme proposed first establishes the 
geometry of the process, then marks areas that are conditionally vulnerable. 
This provides a basis for  advice on the kinds of human attention o r  machine 
sensing and control that can make the risks tolerable. 
Techniques for  representing and analyzing trouble spots in 
Introduction 
This paper outlines the main elements of a scheme for analyzing and 
representing the vulnerability of a structure o r  process, and for indicating kinds of 
intelligent attention that could avoid or repair problems at the vulnerable points or 
regions. 
We want to provide tools, mostly computer-based, for  depicting trouble spots and 
fo r  noting their causes and effects. Distinctively, the analysis is explicit about 
agents, either human o r  machine-resident, that may be involved in noticing and 
doing something about potentially harmful situations. The more usual approach is 
to focus mainly on the devices and processes themselves. However, vulnerability 
and attention are closely related. Generally, unattended processes a re  more likely 
to develop problems, perhaps serious ones. When problems develop in such 
situations, further problems often ensue. Conversely, attention itself, whether 
coming from humans o r  from sensor arrangemenb, may be open to certain 
problems such as  overload or faulty coordination. 
Viewed as an artificial intelligence problem, vulnerability-attention analysis is 
more a matter of knowledge representation than machine inference, though in 
handling causal patterns it seems likely that automated techniques could probably 
save some time. Again, it seems that things go wrong in similar ways for similar 
structures, so that if structural similarity can be established, then an inference 
system might suggest looking fo r  certain kinds of problems. 
Outline of the Analysis 
The steps of the analysis are  as  follows: 
1. Describe the structure o r  process. 
2 .  Identify vulnerable parts, given specified circumstances. 
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3. Analyze the causal antecedents of the problems. 
4 .  Trace effects. 
5 .  Based on this analysis, recommend kinds of intelligence and attention that 
6. Analyze the allocation of intelligent resources relative to availability, 
can be applied to avoid or correct the problems. 
involvement in routine operations, and so on. 
There are  three domains of information in the analysis: 
0 the structure or process itself, 
the broader and less well defined realm of factors that could impact the 
0 the sentient resources and their organization. 
focal structure or process, and 
The structure o r  process domain-which describes and characterizes the 
machine, the manufacturing sequence, the managerial procedure-may be the best 
understood of the three. I t  is also likely to be somewhat idealized. The second 
domain, covering various causal factors that can affect the key process o r  
structure, may also be idealized, though conditions of ordinary use are  likely to  be 
well enough understood. Objectively, the number of potentially influential external 
factors is almost always greater than internal sources. Balancing this diversity of 
possible external causes of problems is the fact that many systems almost always 
function within a small range of environments. Information about the third 
domain, that of the sentient resources, is likely to be more variable. If they are 
humans and only interact occasionally, o r  if these humans are  the designers and 
testers of the system, they will often be taken f o r  granted, or at  least not subject to 
scrutiny and analysis as  part of the system. Generally it seems to be the case that 
humans who might be involved in detecting and guarding against vulnerabilities 
will not be considered so systematically as the machines, unless they are  involved 
in operational steps of machine-based processes, in which case they are  likely to  be 
treated as components of a mechanized system and paced as such. If the sentient 
resources are themselves mechanical, they will be treated as part of the physical 
structure. When the attention of humans is non-routine, for  example when some 
sort of managerial supervision is involved, o r  when attention is needed only 
occasionally, as  when maintenance o r  repair is required, the human resources are  
not likely to  be as  well planned, since these matters are  often not so predictable. In 
some situations, the human resources may be slighted to no ill effect, when some 
persons are  clever enough to juggle many complex processes. An unjustified reason 
for skimping on human attention to risky processes is because the accident has nut 
happened yet, o r  simply to cut costs. 
We believe that all humans associated with a system will have an epistemic or 
knowledge-related role, whether o r  not this is planned by system designers. They 
may also have an action role in the process itself. 
represent the dynamics of knowledge in relation to machine and procedure is a 
major goal of our investigation. 
Attempting to understand and 
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About Vulnerability 
Though vulnerability may be thought of as being a property of objects (intrinsic 
vulnerabih’ty), it has to do both with the structure o r  process and with its 
environment. Trans-situational vulnerability of a system and its parts can be 
characterized, a sort of “others things equal” Vulnerability. But it is usually more 
informative to describe contingent vulnerabii’ify, where susceptibility to problems 
changes with outside factors, history, and so on.. 
LIke much of engineering thought, the ordinary concept of vulnerability focuses 
on the object (device, process, etc.) rather than on its situations of use. However, it 
directly implicates situational factors much more clearly than do terms like “risk” 
o r  “weakness”: a structure is thought of as being vulnerable to something and 
perhaps as being vulnerable in certain ways. 
To say that something o r  someone is vulnerable means that it may receive 
effects, ordinarily from external sources. The additional connotation is that the 
effects may be harmful, o r  may change the recipient’s structure significantly. On 
examination, practically anything in the universe can be affected by something, 
resulting either in a change of state o r  configuration fui’tiinafe vui’nerabii’ify). 
Nevertheless the concept is useful since not everything is equally affected by 
everything else. Thinking of which parts are relatively vulnerable, o r  of the 
overall vulnerability of certain systems, reminds us of some of the associated 
causal scenarios that could result in changes worth noting, and prepares us to deal 
with unwanted change. 
Students in both engineering and psychology classes were asked to identify the 
vulnerable aspects of various entities (objects, devices, procedures, people and 
relationships). They did this easily. In many cases, they linked the undesirable 
results to a part of the entity, for example, a pump that wears out. In other cases 
the problematic region was seen more globally, as in a software system that 
crashed readily but from diverse and unpredictable causes rather than from 
something more localized such as parameter passing between procedures. 
Frequently, design problems seem implicated. Students seem to characterize 
ordinary conditions of use when asked to conceptualize vulnerable aspects of 
machines. Vulnerable behavior of persons is more often thought of as contingent 
on unusual circumstances (being away o r  in a new situation, f o r  example), o r  as 
depending on apparently volitional but statistically unlikely actions of the 
participants. Without going further into discussion of these exercises, the 
implication is that identifying points of vulnerability seems a natural way to think. 
Llstlng the vulnerabflity of parts is convenient for  cataloguing things to watch out 
for  both within a system during operation and in its environment. (Such a list 
could, of course, obscure causal relations, o r  lead one to think that the part is 
somehow responsible for  the things that could happen to it involving potent outside 
sources. 1 
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Representation of Causes and Effects 
Even a bare listing of risky areas can be helpful to someone who must deal 
responsibly with a system. A surface vulnerability description can help channel 
attention and avoid surprises, even when causes of potential problems o r  remedies 
for  them are  not thoroughly understood. 
Causal analysis of events o r  conditions leading to problems will make the 
depiction more thorough and probably easier to conceptualize. 
The depiction of causal paths leading to problems in a structure o r  process is 
more of a challenge than just describing the basic system (itself not always an easy 
task if the system is large or has complex relationships). This is so for  several 
reasons : 
0 In some cases, more than one causal sequence could lead to the same costly 
result. 
0 Causal factors and processes could conceivably be very numerous. 
Frequently they will reside largely in sources outside the basic system, including 
ones that a re  not in the ordinary environment of the system. 
0 Antecedent circumstances may be described loosely. (Our experience is that 
level of abstraction problems are  likely and pernicious.) 
0 Causes of problems may not be understood. Thus there may be nothing to 
represent. (We conjecture that heuristically programmed computer advisory 
systems might suggest problem areas that could be explored.) 
One aim of the analysis is to provide graphic representations of causal processes. 
In doing so, we would like to combine the more abstract tradition of engineering 
analysis which list causes and effects analytically ("A and B causes event C, which 
in the case of state D also causes E to happen.") with the kinds of depiction of linked 
parts o r  pictures of structures and processes that has been more common in recent 
computation (for example, in the renderings of semi-animated devices in various A I  
programs). In vulnerability representations that we have been exploring, causal 
depictions are  linked to parts o r  regions of a basic schematic o r  diagram. In some 
cases, the causal sequences are  almost entirely internal to the parts of the focal 
system, so they can be shown as highlights or certain parameter values of the the 
basic depiction. In most cases, though, a representation of external events, states, 
entities, etc. needs to be included, if only as verbal labels. Generally it is the case 
that alternate causal paths, o r  simply lists of possible sources and kinds and 
problems, must be represented for  a given combination of system part o r  region 
and vulnerability type. Thus, a basic kind of interface with a vulnerability 
representation would be the familiar one of "selecting" a part o r  region, o r  a type 
of failure (or change), then choosing from a display of alternative possibilities and 
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paths leading to this kind of problem, from a menu, a pop-up, o r  similar artifice. 
Because of variations in level of understanding of caural factors, it may not be 
possible to draw diagrams in all cases. Verbal descriptions are often informative, 
though for analysis by the system one would probably want more information on 
connectedness to be included. 
A now-classic format for causal depiction is lshikawa diagrams (see Juran & 
Gryna, 1980, p. 111>, where alternative causal “hypotheses” about failure of parts of 
systems are  attached to arrows which point to parts of an industrial process. 
When it comes to showing the ~f?iicfs of a problematic state o r  event, their 
representation will often be more closely tied to the representation of the focal 
system, since many of the effects may spread within its structure. However, there 
may also be various effects on the environment. Some are immediate but ride- 
effects, remote consequences, and other unwieldy contingencies may come about. 
Generally, the more connected a system is to the outside, either physically o r  
epistemically, the more effects will be representable. 
Problems with causal depictions and with causal analysis in general should be 
noted. Shoham (1988) is one who has recently criticized causal diagrams as being 
oversimplifications. We feel that they may be useful even if they are  something of 
a simplification of what goes on. Even so, tendencies to oversimplify, to assume 
that the conceptual space is the real world, to be optimistic about one’s favorite 
devices, to look for simplified causal villains, and so on, must be kept in mind. 
Comparisons with Traditional Analysis 
Vulnerability-attention analysis does not pretend to compete with traditional 
analyses of failure or fault. It might be thought of as a representation scheme for 
some of the material uncovered o r  formulated under standard methodologies. But 
some similarities and differences are  worth noting. 
We think that there is an advantage in representing the actual structure o r  
process in some degree of detail. By contrast, note that probably the most highly 
developed fault analysis methodology, fault tree analysis barlow et al., 19751, 
depicts Boolean combinations of causal factors and events, rooted in descriptions of 
major conjectured failure states. Working in a causal space, with a manageable 
algebra, allows risk coefficients to be computed in a fairly straightforward way, 
and parts of the causal tree to be scrutinized. It is a strong methodobgy. The 
kinds of descriptions urged here, which summarize the geometry of the focal 
system, together with causal depictions associated with points or regions of the 
system diagram, a re  not so neat when it comes to managing them mathematically. 
However, they have the advantage of calling to mind physical relations of 
adjacency, which may themselves be causally important. For example, when 
problems occur owing to accidental connection of parts that are not supposed to be 
connected (e.g., a solder ball o r  suffusing gas) it is probably easier to think of these 
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with a process/structure diagram o r  drawing than with a wt  of descriptors in an 
abstract space. 
The approach described here is closer in spirit to ordinary failure modes and 
effects analysis, but would probably lean more toward exploring the connectedness 
of the entities and events involved more than is sometimes done. (Failure modes 
analysis is sometimes represented formally; see for example Nielsen, 1975 or Taylor, 
1975.1 
We would like to be able to reduce some of the labor in identifying cause-effect 
factors and paths, which is common to all these methods.. Lhe of the questions of 
vulnerability-attention analysis is whether heuristic analysis, where 
knowledgeable computer programs interact with subject-matter experts, might 
reduce some uf this labor. It seems that a certain amount of system description, as 
well as identification of problem-causing paths, depends on particular knowledge of 
humans. As time goes on it may be possible to incorporate some of this knowledge 
into computer-basfid analysis systems or "suggestion systems", in order to reduce 
some of the tedium of description. 
Vulnerability analysis is closer in basic form, though not necessarily in detail, to 
lshikawa analysis. 
Knowledge Operations 
"Attention" is used here roughly as a synonym for "applied intelligence". It 
serves to point aut that knowledge about a system is not ureful unless it enters into 
some real pracess of noticing, judging, inferring, deciding. adjusting, revising, etc. 
Intelligence-in-the-sitsituation requires someone o r  some knowledgeable machine 
arrangement. 
A variety of persons might be involved with a structure o r  process at different 
times. One can distinguish between pre.aifmztion, rut%&- affmfiun, and p f  - 
affcnfiun relative to an operational phase. Re-attention consists of efforts to find 
out passible symptoms of vulnerability, to understand them, and to provide 
remedies or redesign. On-going attention involves efforts to find symptoms of 
vulnerability during operations. These might be tipped off by anomalous events, or 
more directly cued to reliable indicators of specific problems. Knowledge from 
earlier testing may be useful in this regard. On-going attention may include 
adjustive or currective moves. Post-attention evaluates performance, o r  possibly 
breakdown, after the fact. Attention at any of these stages could benefit from the 
knowledge gained at another stage. 
These knowledge operations may be d&fribuf& ur sfraf i f id  mwr &7~?nf5. For 
example, someone who works closely with a machine system will notice small cues 
that could signal problems. Someone who evaluates statistics of the performance of 
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many such devi- may detect more subtle trends. Managers frequently have 
massive filtering of information, sometimes constrained by regulation o r  custom, as 
well as made difficult by communications werload and slippage, that make the 
evaluation of what is going on quite difficult. 
The approach of vulnerability-attention analysis is knowledge-based rather than 
algorithmic. However, it may use economical and orderly means of identifying 
causes and tracing effects. Included in the logic of the analysis is to give each part 
of the focal system a generic identification, so that more general heuristics can be 
applied to suggest trouble-spots ("This assembly functions as a valve; valves 
frequently have certain problems; therefore look for .  ...") In other cases, expert and 
historical case knowledge would be incorporated, since vulnerability of a system 
and its parts is actually dependent on conditions, and in some cases on particular 
causal histories. 
Risk analysis is often intuitive, certainly knowledge-based, and can be tedious 
and difficult to represent. Analysis bearing on the best kinds of attention and 
intelligence is generally less well understood, possibly because people do a good job of 
it, by and large. Sometimes they do not, however, so more concern with knowledge 
operations seems to be of utmost importance, especially with costly and high-risk 
systems, such as may be found in various parts of the Space program. 
Background: the Context-Sensitive Scheduling Problem 
The analysis discussed in this paper grew out of work which recast a heuristic 
scheduler for  space activities designed by Floyd and Ford (1986) into an object- 
oriented form (Hays and Davis, 1988). Davis (1988) reprogrammed the Floyd-Ford 
scheduler, which in its original form used traditional symbolic programming 
techniques. Though Davis's version maintained an overall flow of control similar to 
the original, the treatment of discrete processes as "objects" which pass messages 
to  other objects (in this case, scheduling procedures) that evaluate their suitability 
for location in a schedule, suggested a partially "decentralized" determination of 
position which was sensitive to power drain, priority, and other factors. 
Yet more radically object-oriented approaches to scheduling could be even more 
suited to nonhierarchically organized environmental contexts. Some higher-level 
evaluation o r  conflict resolution is also needed, of course, to prevent local 
shortsightedness and to insure that a suitable variety of factors are accounted fo r .  
This general kind of decentralized "power" situation for  computational entities was 
discussed in Hays (1977). 
Other Applications to Space-Belated Activities 
Since its beginning, work related to space travel and operations has had to 
consider risky situations. Precise results have had to be obtained in unusual and 
often dangerous environments. In many c a s ,  the impossibility of operational 
attention has meant very careful pre-operational attention leading both to rugged, 
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protective designs and to detailed attention during construction, testing, f l ight  
preparation, and 50 on ( s e ~  for  example the discussions in Bolger, 1975). 
There a re  many occasions for representing vulnerability and for understanding 
the optimal appliwtion of knowledgeable attention in space-related activities. 
Scheduling that is more sensitive to context is just one. Testing of devices and 
procedures, ordinary management for development, design of operational 
environments with shared machine and human monitoring and decision-evaluation, 
and various other computer-assisted operations, a re  all candidates for 
vulnerability-attention analysis. Deeper understandings of knowledge operations, 
and the relation of knuwledge to external process, should produce efficiencies of 
analysis and of performance. 
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